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I 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the decision and judgment of the 
Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, the Honorable Gordon Hall, judge presiding, 
entered on December 18, 1975. Prior to that proceeding the 
Court ruled that the Defendants were guilty of forcible 
entry and detainer and guilty of wrongful eviction, in a 
partial summary judgment signed and entered on May 8, 1975, 
the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Jr., judge presiding. At 
the time for trial, the Court, the Honorable Gordon Hall, 
judge presiding, ruled that the Plaintiff must elect and 
pursue only one cause of action,either forcible entry and 
detainer, or wrongful eviction in proving damages suffered 
by the Plaintiff. The Court further ruled that the Plaintiff 
could not seek punitive damages under a cause of action in 
forcible entry and detainer. The matter was submitted to the 
jury which returned a verdict in favor of the Plaintiff and 
against the Defendants in the sum of twenty ($20.00) dollars. 
The Plaintiff-Appellant would contend that the trial Court 
erred in requiring the Plaintiff to elect between the two 
causes of action, forcible entry and detainer, or wrongful 
eviction at the time of trial, and in ruling that the Plaintiff 
could not seek punitive damages under a cause of action in 
forcible entry and detainer. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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i 
II 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Plaintiff-Appellant seeks a reversal of the 
judgment and decision of the trial Court and that the case 
i 
be remanded to the trial Court for a new trial. 
Ill 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff, Ronald Vickery, brought suit on March 14, 
1975 against his landlords, the Defendants, in both forcible 
entry and wrongful eviction. These causes of action were 
pleaded cumulatively, not alternatively (R. 1-8) . Plaintiff 
moved for summary judgment on the liability issue under both 
causes of action (R. 17). On May 8th, 1975 the Court, the 
Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Jr., judge presiding, granted 
said motion. The order reads, in relevant part: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the PLaintiff is granted 
a Partial Summary Judgment that the Defendants 
jointly and severally are liable to the Plaintiff for 
their actions in the nature of forcible entry and 
detainer and for wrongful eviction as set forth in 
Plaintiff's Complaint. All matters with regard to the 
amount of damages suffered by the Plaintiff shall be 
resolved in a trial hearing and trial. (R. 27-28) 
Defendants did not appeal this decision, nor did they 
preserve the issue for later appeal by filing notice 
pursuant to Rule 72 (a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
On December 18th, 1975, immediately prior to commencement 
of the trial on damages, the court, the Honorable Gordon 
Hall, judge presiding, granted (over Plaintiff's objection) 
Defendants' motion that Plaintiff be required to elect 
on which cause of action he wished to prove damages. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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(R. 114-124) Plaintiff elected forcible entry. At 
trial Plaintiff did not prove special damages but did prove 
general damages-i.e. harm to Plaintiff's dignitary interests. 
The Court ruled the Plaintiff could not prove punitive 
damages in a forcible entry action (R. 114-124) . The Court 
ultimately instructed the jury that general damages were 
recoverable under the Forcible Entry Statute, it had earlier 
ruled that they were not. Similarly, in chambers after 
Defendants1 motion for directed verdict the Court reversed 
its decision requiring an election, and then reversed the 
reversal. (R. 118-120). The jury returned a verdict of 
twenty ($20.00) dollars in favor of the Plaintiff. (R. 86) 
Plaintiff's motion for a new trial was denied. (R. 97-98) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DEFENDANTS LIABILITY UNDER CAUSES OF ACTION IN 
BOTH FORCIBLE ENTRY AND WRONGFUL EVICTION WAS RES JUDICATA 
AND THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RECONSIDERING THAT ISSUE AND 
REQUIRING THE PLAINTIFF TO ELECT BETWEEN THOSE CAUSES OF 
ACTION AT THE TIME OF TRIAL. 
The Court's Order granting summary judgment as to 
liability under both forcible entry and wrongful eviction 
was signed and entered on May 8th, 1975. Rule 73 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure gives litigants one month 
after the entry of a judgment or order to perfect a direct 
appeal to the Utah Supreme Court. Rule 72 (a) gives litigants 
the right to preserve an issue for appeal by filing notice 
within one month of pnfrv nf in^^^+- -?~ —i 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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further issues remain to be determined. At the expiration of 
these time periods, Defendants1 liability under both causes { 
of action was inalterably fixed by accepted principles of 
res judicata. Restatement, Judgments § 1. Therefore, it 
was not proper for the Court to eliminate the Defendantsf 
liability under one cause of action by requiring an election. 
The Court was limited to the determination of the "amount 
of damages suffered by the Plaintiff" under each cause of 
action. Any danger of double recovery could have been 
avoided by allocating overlapping items of damage to one 
cause of action or the other via jury instructions. The 
Plaintiff should have been allowed by the trial Court to 
proceed on both causes of action. 
POINT II 
THE REQUIREMENT OF AN ELECTION BETWEEN DAMAGES IN 
FORCIBLE ENTRY OR WRONGFUL EVICTION WAS IN ERROR. 
Prior Utah case law is of little assistance in determining 
whether forcible entry and wrongful eviction are alternative 
or cumulative remedies. There is only one reported case, 
Wangsgard v. Fitzpatrick, 542 p.2d 194 (1975). in which 
both causes of action were pleaded, and that case did not 
deal with the central issue here. 
When a Plaintiff has two inconsistent remedies available 
to him for the redress of a single right, he is required 
by the doctrine of election of remedies to elect one of 
those remedies. 25 Am. Jur. 2d, Election of Remedies,§§ 
10-12. Both forcible entry and wrongful eviction are 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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remedies for the redress of the same right - the right to be 
secure in one's dwelling from the forcible entries of third 
persons. The crucial issue is whether they are inconsistent. 
If so, there is the further question of when the Plaintiff 
should be required to elect. 
"Inconsistency'1 as used here does not mean mere theoretics 
inconsistency - though the doctrine is often applied in 
contract cases to limit recovery to remedies based either on 
affirmance and disaffirmance of the contract. In any event, 
there is nothing theoretically inconsistent in a dispossessed 
Plaintiff asking to be restored to possession of his property 
under Forcible Entry, and to be fully compensated under some 
combination of forcible entry and wrongful eviction for the 
injury he suffered, both pecuniary and non-pecuniary, and 
also for a punitive damage recovery. 
The inconsistency here at issue is whether allowing 
recovery under both remedies would over-compensate the 
Plaintiff. Whether this is so depends on the remedial 
elements under both causes of action. Plaintiff concedes, 
that he should not recover twice for the same remedial 
element. 
Under wrongful eviction, Plaintiff may recover for 
pecuniary damage incidental to the forcible entry; for 
injury to his dignitary interests - humiliation, mental 
anguish, etc. Lambert v. Sine, 123 Utah 145, 256 p. 2d 241 
(1953); and for punitive damages in a proper case. Freeway 
Park Building, Inc. v. Western States Wholesale Supply, 22 
Utah 2d 266, 451 p. 2d 778 (1969). Clearly, no writ of Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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restitution will issue in a wrongful eviction action. 
Under forcible entry, Plaintiff may obtain a writ of < 
restitution, and also three times Mthe damages occasioned 
to" him by the forcible entry. U. C. A. §78-36-10 (1953). 
The treble damages provision has been considered "highly 
penal" by the Utah Court and thus subject to strict constructioi 
Forrester v. Cook, 77 U. 137 at 155, 292 p.206 at 214 (1930), 
In the case at bar, the trial Court originally felt that only 
pecuniary damage incidental to ouster was subject to 
trebling, but later instructed the jury that general damage 
was also recoverable under the statute. Whether the trial 
Court was correct in so doing is open to question in 
view of the strict construction of doctrine. General 
damages would seem to fit writhin the statutory language 
"damage to the Plaintiff". 
The trial Court further held that punitive damages 
were not recoverable in forcible entry proceedings, 
presumably on the theory that the treble damages provision 
is punitive in itself. This ruling contradicts Peterson 
v. Piatt, 16 Utah 2d 330, 400 p. 2d 507 (1965) in which 
punitive damages were awarded and apparently trebled. It 
further results in the anomaly that a malicious Defendant 
with no legal interest in the property is no more liable 
under forcible entry than a non-malicious owner who merely 
wants rightful possession of his property, and forcibly 
enters in the mistaken belief that he is within the law in 
doing so. 
TVio nnnrlusion of this analysis is that it is difficult Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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to determine whether forcible entry and wrongful eviction is 
are inconsistent remedies because the elements of damage 
recoverable under forcible entry are ill-defined. It is 
Plaintiff's position that the law should: 
1) fully compensate a Plaintiff for Defendant's 
forcible entry - i.e. that he should recover both 
pecuniary and non-pecuniary general damage (plus 
special damages had he been able to prove them), and 
punitive damages, and 
2) allow him to choose, without affecting his recoverable 
damages, whether he wishes to be restored to possession. 
Insofar as this result may be reached by allowing Plaintiff 
to recover under both forcible entry and wrongful eviction, 
Plaintiff maintains those actions are not inconsistent and 
should be considered cumulative. 
Under the treble damages provision U. C. A. 78-36-10 
(1953) as it is now interpreted by Utah Courts it is difficult 
to achieve the desired result. Plaintiff therefore urges that 
Utah adopt an interpretation similar to that Idaho has taken 
with regard to its nearly identical treble damages provision. 
In Pearson v. Harfer, 87 Idaho 245, 329 p. 2d 687 (1964), 
the Idaho Supreme Court stated at 694: 
We are of the view that the legislative intent... 
was to require, as a prerequisite to an award of treble 
damages, a finding that the waste was willfully, 
wantonly, or maliciously commited. There being 
no finding by the trial*court in this regard... 
the judgment must be reversed and the cause remanded 
for the trial court to enter specific findings 
thereon.., 
In Mecham v. Nelson, 92 Idaho 783, 451 p. 2d 529 (1969) 
the Idaho Court made clear that- a^u ~ ~--T - - •» • -
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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11 
elements of damage ( not merely waste) under the Idaho 
forcible entry statute. 
It is clear from the Utah case Eccles v. Union Pacific 
Coal Co. , III, 14, 48P. 148, that a Court lacks discretion 
as to the trebling of damages in a forcible detainer action, 
and that if there was a forcible detainer the damages suffered 
must be trebled. It is clear that under Utah law malicious 
or the intentions which normally justify an award of 
punitive damages are irrelevant in awarding treble damages 
in unlawful detainer and forcible entry actions. Thus 
under current Utah law treble damages are not a substitute 
for punitive damages. 
A tenant wrongfully disturbed in his occupancy should 
be fully compensated for the damage suffered, both general 
and special. In addition, if the facts warrant, the tenant 
should be allowed to recover punitive damages. In order to 
accomplish this end, a Plaintiff should not be required 
to elect between damages in forcible entry or wrongful 
eviction by should be allowed to pursue both causes and the COT. 
should instruct the jury as to duplicate damages or the Court 
after a verdict should consider and eliminate any duplicate 
damages. 
POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED IN REQUIRING AN ELECTION BETWEEN 
REMEDIES BEFORE THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE TRIAL. 
There is a split of authority as to when an election 
should be required. This is understandable because of the 
varying causes of action involved, and the differing Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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possibilities of prejudice to the Defendant if election 
delayed. Many Courts have insisted that no election be 
required before the case is submitted to the judge or 
jury. In Williams v. Marshall, 37 Cal. 2d 445 at 457, 
235 P. 2d 372 at 379 (1951) the California Supreme Court 
stated: 
At various stages of the trial, the Marshalls 
unsuccessfully moved the trial Court to compel 
an election between the alternative remedies of 
rescission and damages. They argue that as a result 
of these erroneous rulings, they were compelled to 
defend on both theories. 
A defrauded vendee may, in the same action, seek 
rescission or damages in the event rescission cannot 
be obtained...there is no good reason why the Plaintiff 
in such an action should be compelled to make an election 
between those remedies during the course of the trial, 
and such a rule would be contrary to fundamental 
principles of law. 
See also North American Graphic Corporation v. Allan, 184 
F. 2d 387 (1950) where the Court allowed Plaintiff to go to 
the jury on both contract and quasi-contract theories because 
the Defendant did not show detrimental reliance on Plaintiff's 
prior actions indicating he would proceed on a contract theory. 
In the instant case, there was no detrimental reliance 
on Defendants' part. He came to Court fully prepared to 
defend both causes of action. His motion for election was 
made immediately prior to trial. His interests would not 
have been unfairly prejudiced had the trial Court permitted 
Plaintiff to proceed ot prove both causes of action, and to 
elect his remedy before going to the jury. It was Plaintiff 
who was unfairly prejudiced here. His whole trial plan 
was upset by the requirement of election immediately 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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(and without prior notice) before trial. Furthermore, in 
view of the unsettled law on recoverable damages in forcible 
entry, he could not possible make an informed election in 
any event. 
Therefore, it was error to require an election before 
trial under the facts of this case. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff-Appellant respectfully submits that 
the District Court erroneously required the Plaintiff 
at the time of trial to elect between pursuing damages 
under a cause of action in Forcible Entry or a cause 
of action in Wrongful Eviction, and erroneously ruled 
that the Plaintiff could not seek and prove punitive 
damages under a cause of action in Forcible Entry0 
The decision and judgment of the Trial Court 
should be reversed, and the matter remanded to the 
Trial Court for a new trial with appropriate 
instructions from this Court0 
Respectfully submitted, 
BRIAN M0 BARNARD 
214 East Fifth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Plaintiff-
Appellant 
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